The report also stated the majority of active shooter attacks occurred during the school day (93 percent) and inside a building (80 percent), with most taking place in hallways (24 percent), classrooms (21 percent), and cafeterias (13 percent). Though most attacks occurred inside a building, 20 percent were outside. Some of these involved the perpetrator shooting at windows and entrances to gain access.
Out of the active shooter incidents where gunfire struck a school’s entrance or window, 35 struck an exterior window, 12 struck an entry point, and 11 struck an interior window opening. There are more than 30 examples since 1985 of shooters gaining access to school buildings and interior rooms by shooting at windows, doors, and other whole fenestration product assemblies.
Preventative measures
Alarm systems, security cameras, and other technology help to deter, detect, and distract a potential risk, and quickly alert emergency responders. When these deterrents fail, physical barriers are the first line of defense. Windows, doors, and fenestration systems offer transparency to see and assess the risk, but with an active shooter, ground-level glass also can become the first target.
The Whole Building Design Guide (WBDG) resources on active shooter protective design4 notes, “Ultimately, there are two options: impede the shooter or impede the bullet.” Further, it states, “Since most active shooter events generally last only minutes, access denial can be an effective way to mitigate potential losses. Slowing or delaying an aggressor by just a minute or seconds may give law enforcement time to arrive before mass casualties are incurred.”
The WBDG acknowledges how specifying fenestration product assemblies similar to those in high-security courthouses and embassies “is often not practical, cost-effective, or even desired” for schools. “Analysis of footage from actual active shooter events have shown the shooter will likely not spend significant time trying to get through a particular door if it is locked or blocked,” continued the WBDG. “Rather they move to their next target. They know law enforcement is on its way and their time is limited.”
Given “the current architectural preference for large amounts of glazing to provide natural light into spaces,” the WBDG recommends where windows are present, “they contain laminated glass which provides some resistance to ballistics attack and forced entry.” It adds, “some level of protective glazing, especially for windows and doors near lobbies and other entrances offer a potential area where simple improvements can provide significant benefit.”
The WBDG also cautioned, “The lack of guidance documents focusing specifically on active shooter designs will likely lead to varying levels of implementation and reliance on methods and technologies which may not be as effective or cost efficient.”
